Last night’s Newsnight Scotland highlighted the utter confusion in the media mind about the referendum, the nature and wording of the questions, the definitions of independence, full fiscal autonomy and its jargon titles – devo max and indy lite.
Neither Gordon Brewer’s questions nor the panel’s responses shed any light into this increasingly murky pool. There is a distinct lack of clarity of thought evident on this vital process – if anyone, politician or media interviewer possesses such clarity, they are doing a bloody good job of concealing it, for whatever reason.
(It’s not as if detailed consideration hasn’t been given to this – in February/March 2010, a detailed consultation exercise was launched, and I responded to it, both directly and in my blog. Unfortunately, I cannot trace my original blog response, but ones immediately after it are reproduced below. Of course all that was in the context of Calman, but the essential arguments are still there. Two alternative versions of the question on Ballot Paper 1 were consulted through the National Conversation, not just to the opposition parties but to the entire electorate. So much for the unionist nonsense that the SNP hasn’t consulted the people of Scotland – they have. )
THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM
I will leave aside the exact wording of the question or questions that may be put in the independence referendum. They will be the subject of much partisan argument, with the extremes of both nationalist and unionist caricatured as
Do You want your country to be free of the venal and warmongering UK ,and be independent at last?
to
Do you want to rip the heart out of a 300-year Union that has served the Great British People well by separation?
(In point of fact, the nationalist have never even come close to such an extreme version, but the unionists are trumpeting very similar phrases daily!)
The SNP wants full independence, a concept that has never required definition by any nation in history, and therefore they ideally want a single YES/NO question, which however it is worded, means Get out of the UK or Stay in the UK. In fact, my ideal question to a Scottish electorate would be Get oot or Stay in?
However, the elected Scottish Government are democrats, and all the polls indicate that the Scottish electorate see an alternative choice to the simple out or in choice, i.e. maximum powers to the devolved Scottish Government while remaining part of the sovereign state of the UK, sometimes called full fiscal autonomy, and colloquially devo max or indy lite.
Although the official stance of the main opposition parties at UK level is against such a referendum option, significant Scottish unionist voices seem to favour it.
So, both on the apparent wishes of the people of Scotland, and some significant Scottish unionists, another referendum choice seems inevitable, even if it is not what the SNP wants.
The SNP knows very clearly what full fiscal autonomy means, but the unionists seem to be in a state of deep confusion about what they mean by additional powers. Not unreasonably, the SNP feels that it is up to the unionists to define what they mean by it if it is an option that they want.
However, the bigger question is this -
What if successive opinion polls between now and the referendum continue to show a wish for this option by Scottish voters, but the unionist parties are totally against it?
If this is the situation, the democratically elected government of Scotland may feel that the voters must be offered this alternative to full independence.
THE UNIONIST ARGUMENT (as I understand it)
If the Scottish people vote for full independence, this will automatically deliver full fiscal autonomy. If they reject independence, this maintains the status quo, but does not preclude post-referendum debate about, and progress towards additional powers for Scotland, perhaps even full fiscal autonomy.
THE NATIONALIST ARGUMENT (as I understand it)
A simple YES/NO vote for or against independence would deny that sector of the Scottish people a voice who want full fiscal autonomy while remaining in the union. Neither outcome to the referendum would meet their dual objectives.
The positions I outline above represent the ‘respectable’ public positions of both unionist and nationalist – the realpolitik positions may be stated as follows -
THE UNIONIST realpolitik ARGUMENT
If the polls are accurate, a simple YES/NO option will be a finely judged gamble on a successful NO vote, but it is a gamble we must take, since the referendum is now inevitable. We must rely on our anti-independence campaign to swing the vote. A rejection of independence would remove it from the agenda for a generation, and might fatally damage the SNP.
A third option – full fiscal autonomy – has a greater chance of success, if the polls are accurate, and some nationalists might hedge their bet on that option. If successful, it would create a devolved Scottish Government powerful enough to force another referendum on full independence at a later date. We must reject such an option on the ballot paper.
THE NATIONALIST realpolitik ARGUMENT
If the polls are accurate, a simple YES/NO option would be a finely judged gamble on a successful YES vote if taken now, but it is a gamble we don’t have to take, since the referendum is at least two years away. A rejection of independence would remove it from the agenda for a generation, and might fatally damage the SNP. We will rely on performance in government and our pro-independence campaign to swing the vote.
A third option – full fiscal autonomy – may have a greater chance of success, if the polls are accurate, and some unionist voters might hedge their bet on that option. If successful, it would create a devolved Scottish Government powerful enough to force another referendum on full independence at a later date. If the polls are still finely balanced closer to the referendum date, we must insist on that option. If the polls are running significantly in our favour, it would still probably make sense to include it.
PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES OF THE REFERENDUM BALLOT PAPER AND VOTING
My speculation above about the realpolitik (which I regard as flawed in part in both cases) shows that in many respects the nationalist and unionist camps are mirror-images of each other – that’s politics …
If a single YES/NO question is adopted, there are few problems - other than the framing of the question itself – and providing a simple majority of those voting (not of those eligible to vote) i.e. 51%, will determine the outcome.
But if the full fiscal autonomy option is to be offered, there are problems. (They were examined back in 2010 – see below - in a slightly different context, but the essential arguments and problems remain the same.)
Let me leave aside any precedents on how previous referendums were conducted – I believe this one demands a fresh look. Here are the options I see – there may well be more -
OPTION ONE FOR A THREE CHOICE BALLOT
Treat the referendum ballot paper like an election ballot paper in a first-past-the-post electoral system, with three candidates -
FULL INDEPENDENCE (out of UK)
STATUS QUO (stay in UK)
FULL FISCAL AUTONOMY (stay in UK)
Choose only one option – no second preferences, no multiple voting. Option with the highest percentage of votes wins the referendum
This approach contains the key strength and key weakness of a FTP system – it is almost always produces a clear winner (don’t confuse this with hung Parliaments – it about selecting a single option) but the winner may represent a minority of the total votes cast.
A dead heat between the three options or between two of the options is highly unlikely, but clearly a possibility, and it must be specified in advance how such an outcome must be handled. As I see it, the only option to such an outcome must be a new ballot. An example will allow you to consider what your judgement would be in such a situation -
FULL INDEPENDENCE - 34% of total vote
STATUS QUO - 34% of total vote
FULL FISCAL AUTONOMY - 32% of total vote
Some unionists might argue that this represents a 66% vote for remaining in the Union, but such an argument would be as invalid as advancing it if full independence had the highest FTP percentage would be.
A proportional representation argument cannot be advanced in a such a referendum, since it is in fact equates to single representative for constitutional change. It is of course an argument that can be advanced against the referendum ballot structure, and some would argue that a minimum 51% majority of all votes cast should apply. The dead heat example would have to be pre-specified, but any outcome short of a 51% majority would be criticised if this method were adopted, but the criticism could not affect the FTP result if one option had the highest percentage vote, albeit a majority of those voting.
Another dead heat option, albeit one that affects the initial ballot, is to allow the voters to choose a fallback option in the ballot – a second preference - (or to choose only one option)and in the event of a dead heat, – but only in the event of a dead heat - the second choice votes would be transferred to their first choice option if no option had the highest percentage of the vote.
All things considered, given the low probability of a dead heat, this seems an undue complication, therefore I favour the ballot re-run option in the event of a dead heat.
OPTION TWO FOR A THREE CHOICE BALLOT – the TWO BALLOT PAPER OPTION
This option recognises that voters who want to remain to remain in the UK and voters who want to leave it may also want full fiscal autonomy. There also may be voters who want to remain in the UK and do not want full fiscal autonomy. It may be argued that those who want to remain in the UK without fiscal autonomy have their vote recognised by opting for the status quo, and those who want independence by definition get full fiscal autonomy by their vote. The argument for adopting the Option One voting mechanism is that those who want fiscal autonomy and to remain in the UK do not have their preference recognised by a simple YES/NO independence vote.
How else can this circle be squared?
Well, one way, imperfect as all the others are, is to have two ballot papers – one, a simple YES/NO to independence and two, a full fiscal autonomy YES/NO ballot paper. The count for each ballot paper would be independent and produce a separate result, both determined by a simple majority. Electors would obviously be free to complete only one ballot paper if they so chose.
This method would produce one of the following outcomes -
1. A simple majority for independence coupled with a simple majority for full fiscal autonomy
(In this outcome, the independence vote has de facto delivered fiscal autonomy, it is supported by the other ballot, and the SNP Government’s path is clear. The UK is effectively at an end after negotiations are complete. But see caveat below on the size of the respective votes.)
2. A simple majority for independence coupled with a simple majority for the status quo
(This outcome is a mandate for the Scottish Government to negotiate the terms of independence, but with their negotiating position prejudiced by the status quo vote in fiscal powers. The worm in the apple is that, although the fiscal autonomy ballot cannot overturn the vote for independence. the size of the status quo percentage must be a concern.
It may be a highly unlikely outcome, if one makes the assumption that all voters complete both ballot papers, make no mistakes and vote consistently for or against the status quo, but strange things happen in the voting booth!)
3. A simple majority for the status quo coupled with a simple majority for full fiscal powers
(This outcome means that the Scottish Government may not negotiate the terms of independence but must attempt to secure full fiscal powers from the sovereign UK government, which now has little incentive to offer them, since the SNP Government has been seriously weakened by the vote against independence.)
4. A simple majority for the status quo vs independence, coupled with a simple majority for the status quo on fiscal powers
(This would be a decisive outcome for the UK Government. There would be no new referendum in a generation, and the SNP Government and the SNP Party would be seriously weakened.)
The other problem with this approach is that it faces voters with complex tactical decisions. The independence YES/NO vote is clear enough, except for the tiny minority of unionists who would refuse to complete this ballot paper, but would complete the fiscal powers ballot paper. But the fiscal powers ballot paper gives rise to difficult choices for both camps, but especially nationalists.
The most problematical outcome, in my view, would be on outcome one, above, despite it being an apparently decisive win/win for the SNP Government -
A simple majority for independence coupled with a simple majority for full fiscal autonomy
Although each outcome is determined by a simple arithmetical majority – a minimum of 51% of the vote – the size of the majorities will be crucial to how the outcome is viewed, and how the outcome is viewed could divide the nation.
Consider this possible outcome – a 51% majority for independence and, say, a 90% majority for full fiscal autonomy. The SNP will argue that this is a decisive majority for independence, because each ballot stands alone, and full fiscal autonomy is contained de facto within independence, but the Union parties and the Westminster Government will argue, that regardless of the two ballots, it is a mandate for remaining in the union with fiscal autonomy, and the 90% ballot trumps the 51% ballot.
SUMMARY
I found this very difficult to think through – as I did in 2010 – and my analysis may well be deeply flawed, have missed other possibilities and options, and may be contradictory in some aspects. But I am trying, as a voter, to understand, and I don’t envy any thinking voter faced with such choices.
Please offer your contributions, corrections, value judgements, etc. but please don’t offer URL links unless you are prepared to insert the proper hyperlink codes at either end of the URL – I have not got the time to do it for you in the comments boxes.
The 2010 background -
Consultation Questions Scotland’s Future: My response in 2010
Draft Referendum (Scotland) Bill Consultation Paper
Question 1: What are your views on the proposed referendum which seeks the people’s views on two proposals for extending the powers of the Scottish Parliament?
I am fully in favour of a referendum on the options on Scottish independence
Question 2: What do you think should be the first proposal in that referendum: full devolution (Version 1 of Ballot Paper 1), or the Calman-based option (Version 2 of Ballot Paper 1)?
Full devolution
Question 3: The Scottish Government proposes voting method 2 (two separate yes/no questions). What are your views on this?
I agree with two YES/NO questions
Question 4: What are your views on the wording and format of the ballot papers?
The wording and format are acceptable, but the voter choice of completing one or both ballot papers creates complex tactical voting options, and may confuse voters, however, I see no alternative that is more satisfactory. A lot of pre-referendum educational work (non-partisan)has to be done to ensure clarity for voters. Inevitably there will also be party propaganda from all interested parties and the media, and much distortion of the choice. Again, I believe this to be one of the untidy but necessary parts of democracy.
Question 5: What are your views on the proposals for how the poll is conducted and on eligibility to vote?
The poll should be conducted at a time well distant from any other local or national elections, and should be subjected to all the safeguards and checks and balances of a general election. Ideally, I would like to see all Scottish permanent residents of 16 years of age or over to be eligible to vote, but I realise that major difficulties would arise over eligibility of those not yet on the voters roll, i.e. under 18 years of age. My default is therefore all adults eligible to vote in a local or general election.
Question 6: What are your views on the proposed rules for the referendum campaign?
I am in full agreement with the rules as set out in the draft bill.
Question 7: Do you have any other comments about the proposals in the draft Referendum (Scotland) Bill?
They are all contained in my blog 26/27 February 2010
BLOG COMMENTS 2010
Friday, 26 February 2010
It has been pointed out to me that the two alternative versions of the question on Ballot Paper 1 are being consulted through the National Conversation, not just to the opposition parties but to the entire electorate. I accept this factual correction, but my view is still that it is in essence aimed at the opposition parties, since their reaction to it will be of major significance if one or more of them shift their total opposition to the independence referendum after the general election.
The electorate has no formal vote on this, just the opportunity to respond to consultation - not quite the same thing. Whether they can ever vote on Ballot Paper 1 in whatever form will depend on the opposition parties and Holyrood.
Nevertheless, I apologise if my analysis was misleading in this regard.
Saturday, 27 February 2010
I thought my analysis had perhaps over-complicated a simple choice, but more correspondence suggests that my analysis – and dismissal - of voter types Three and Four did not go far enough, and that I should leave such arcane speculation to psephologists. I accept the criticism, but reject the advice.
Ordinary voters are faced with this analysis and these choices, and need help in thinking it through. Who will offer that help?
The point has been made that Voter type Three has a more complex choice to make than I had originally stated, and that the option of disregarding one of the ballot papers is a valid option for him/her, and requires more analysis. Let’s look again …
Voter Three believes that more devolved powers are a waste of time – what is required is full independence.
Ignoring Ballot Paper One and voting YES, I AGREE on Ballot Paper Two rejects more devolved powers but endorses independence, but it risks losing the chance of influencing devolved powers as a fallback if the overall independence vote fails to secure a majority.
However, voting YES, I AGREE on both ballot papers runs the risk that if the total number of votes cast for more devolved powers exceeds the votes for independence, opponents of independence can argue that one outweighs the other, and the electorate prefers the devolution option. (However, a simple majority for independence would still trump devolution – see below.)
Voter Four believes that more devolved powers are the right way to go, but believes that a vote on independence should not have been offered and is a waste of time.
Voting YES, I AGREE to more devolved powers on Ballot Paper One but ignoring Ballot Paper Two loses the opportunity to influence a rejection on independence, and is a far more risky option than ignoring Ballot Paper One, with much more significant implications.
Voting YES, I AGREE to more devolved powers on Ballot Paper One and NO, I DISAGREE on Ballot Paper 2 can only help his/her position, and runs no risk equivalent to Voter Three’s more complex choices.
The difficulty with the above analysis is that if a simple 51% majority determines the outcome, independence trumps devolution. If, say, 60% of the votes cast were for devolution and 51% for independence, an independent Scotland would still be the outcome.
More devolution is a fallback position for supporters of independence, but independence is not a fallback option for opponents of independence.
EXAMINING SOME POSSIBLE OUTCOMES
Outcome One:
49% vote for devolution option, 49% vote for independence.
Voter Three: By ignoring the devolution ballot paper, he/she has contributed to a no change outcome, and may have missed the chance of devolution max – surely a better outcome than no change?
Outcome Two:
90% vote for devolution. 51% vote for independence.
Voter Four: By ignoring the independence ballot paper, he/she has missed a chance to contributing to a defeat of the independence vote.
Although this should be a clear win for independence under the 51% rule, unionists might mount a challenge to the validity of an independence outcome, on the basis that a massive majority of voters preferred devolution extension to independence.
Although such a challenge ought to be invalid under the rules, and on the challengers’ unsubstantiated conclusion drawn from the outcome, don’t think that the unionist opposition parties wouldn’t use it, and don’t think it wouldn’t be a major negative factor in the Scottish Government’s attempts to negotiate the terms of the independence settlement.
Remember, a referendum ballot majority for independence doesn’t bind the UK government to grant it, and Westminster would use an outcome similar to Outcome Two to deny it.
POSTSCRIPT
I readily admit that I am finding difficulty in getting my thinking straight on the voting options, and I am open to any help I can get. My wee heid is hurting …
More pragmatic political animals might argue that all such tactical consideration should be ignored, and that everyone should vote on both papers for what option they believe in. They may be right …
But I fear that some confusion will reign in the polling booth unless some objective guidance is given. In a situation where unionists have no interest at all in the existence of an well-informed, politically-aware Scottish electorate, the default position will be emotional unionist rhetoric rather than objectivity.
The SNP, of course, will be on the side of the angels and will avoid such populism. Well, I can hope, can’t I?