As we wait for the Chilcot Report …

Waiting for Chilcot is a bit like waiting for Godot. Idly checking back in my past ruminations on the war, I came across these comment of mine in the Guardian, circa 2008.

Guardian, comments 18 December 2008

I have been totally opposed to the Iraq war, from the lies, special pleading and moral cowardice that led up to it and throughout the horror, mendacity and ineptitude of its dreadful progress. But I am shocked at the unrealistic and superficial attitude of many of the comments on the role of the British armed forces, from armchair critics who have never been near a battlefield, have never placed themselves in harms way, and have never laid their life on the line for their country. To compare our soldiers, directly or by implication, to Nazis, is obscene and inaccurate.

The responsibility for the crimes against humanity in Iraq lies with the politicians who initiated it, to the members of Parliament who voted for it, and to the electors of Britain who continued to return them to power after the war started, and who continue to support them in government - and to the religious factions and tribal demagogues who manipulate the tortured people of Iraq, and naive - and always young - idealists from other nations, perverting their religious beliefs and the teachings of Islam to suit their evil and self-serving ends.

There have been atrocities - a minority of serving soldiers have behaved badly, and their superiors have failed by omission or commission to prevent this. But such aberrations occur in every war, and where possible, it has been exposed and punished.

But the prosecution of the war by British forces has been conducted in as principled a way as the exigencies of any war permit. An individual serving soldier may, at great personal risk, refuse to carry out an order in a specific instance that violates accepted codes of morality and international law, but to expect serving soldiers at any level to refuse to carry out their orders because of complex political argument at levels far above them is to expect the impossible. It is simplistic and brutally uncaring.

And what of the generals? Once our generals start to pursue their own agenda and their own political beliefs by confronting their political masters, we are headed for a junta. I hold no brief for Sir Jock Stirrup, and I think he should have thought, and thought again before committing his vapourings to print, but I do not believe he should have disobeyed his order.

I am a Scottish nationalist, and I fervently wish to be free of the Union that sacrifices the brave young men and women of Scotland to serve the vaunting ambition and vanity of despicable Scots like Blair and Brown, and permits them to send young men and women to their deaths, but I have never doubted the bravery and professionalism of the armed forces. In a very real sense, it is a greater sacrifice to do your job and die for your country in pursuit of a cause you do not believe in, because the majority of the people of your country have willed that act.

Place the blame where it squarely lies - with the politicians and the people who put them there. Leave our armed forces to mourn their dead and maimed comrades, and their families to cry out against those who sent them to their fate. 

Blair, Brown, Bush and Cheney attempt to justify their actions, but the verdict of history will damn them. The ancient Greeks recognised their type, and foresaw their fate.

The gods fail not to mark those who have killed many
The black Furies, stalking the man fortunate beyond all right
Wrench back again the set of his life and drop him to darkness.
There, among the ciphers, there is no more comfort in power
And the vaunt of high glory is bitterness.

AESCHYLUS - Agammenon

It is Britain's, and the Labour Party's abiding shame that two Labour Prime Ministers initiated, supported, and still defend the enormity of the Iraq conflict.

Iraq, The Chilcot Report – and Scottish Labour’s attempts to airbrush them out of GE2015 campaign

James Kelly demonstrates all the abysmal levels of debating skills, and rhetoric, plus lack of focus and absence of logical rigour for which Scottish Labour are justly notorious.

He doesn't want to be debating The Chilcot Report at all. Neither does his leader, Blairite Jim Murphy, nor his strategist, John McTernan, nor his party, Scottish Labour. The Peace Envoy wouldn't like it ...

 

Labour would dearly love to airbrush the Iraq War, The Chilcot Report, Blair and the Blair/Brown Government out of the general election debate, as Mary Fee's closing remarks show - but they can't - they have inconvenient evidence of them incarnate in Jim Murphy and his chief  strategist, John McTernan on their doorstep - and in the 'big beast' summoned to bale out Murphy's failing leadership, Gordon Brown - the banker of the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars, fully supportive of, and fully complicit in both.

SNP/Green/Plaid bloc has to buttress Miliband against the Blairites after May 7th

SNP/Green/Plaid bloc has to buttress Miliband against the Blairites after May 7th NHS, Labour and privatisation -Labour, deeply divided into two camps on NHS - and many other key issues.

We already know what camp Murphy is in - the one inhabited by all his Blairite pals.
Scots have to choose between Labour and Tories/LibDems after May 7th, and we have to trust Labour, or least that Miliband wing of Labour that is halfway rational about the NHS, the economy, welfare and Trident. An SNP/Green/Plaid bloc has to buttress Miliband against the Blairites in his own party, and they include Jim Murphy.

Conditional trust only - for a price - in a confidence and supply arrangement, with a series of key conditions set by Nicola and Cabinet in Scotland through her team in Westminster. That's the new game ...

Survation polling - GE2015

I thought this might prove useful to those tracking the 2015 General election -

With 100 days to go until the general election, Survation on behalf of the Daily Mirror interviewed 1,014 Great British adults online about a range of political issues. (Fieldwork was conducted on Sunday 25 January.)

Headline voting intention (with change in brackets since 24 December 2014):

CON 31% (+2); LAB 30% (-2); UKIP 23% (+3); LD 7% (-4); SNP 5% (+2); GRE 3% (+1); OTHER 1% (0)

For the Daily Mirror's analysis, see here. For full questions put to respondents, weighted data tables and methodology see here.

This poll is the first in a new monthly series. We will be tracking a range of political views in the run up to the UK general election on 7 May. For any enquiries, please contact

0203 142 7642 or researchteam@survation.com.

Keep up to date with all of Survation’s research and analysis on our blog.

Follow us on Twitter@survation

Find out more about the services Survation provide by following this link.

For press enquiries, please call 0203 142 7642 or email enquiry@survation.com

Survation is a member of the British Polling Council and abides by its rules.

http://www.britishpollingcouncil.org

Survation Ltd  Registered in England & Wales Number 07143509

The Trident Renewal Debate – 20th Jan 2015

#Trident The moral and intellectual, not to mention the strategic and economic bankruptcy of the pro-nuclear case is staggeringly evident.

 #Trident Trident Debate 20 Jan 2015: Dame Joan Ruddock - Part 2  "Nuclear weapons have no utility..."

#Trident Trident Debate 20 Jan 2015: Dame Joan Ruddock - Part 1 “A unilateralist is a multilateralist who means it!"

#Trident #WMD God help us - look who's in the Deputy Speaker's chair - Eleanor Laing MP! -

#Trident #WMD Trident debate, 20 Jan 2015: Angus Robertson - Part Two

#Trident My least favourite Scottish MP, Rory Stewart (Jim Murphy close second) is on his feet

#Trident I take my hat off to Labour MPs attending who spoke for the motion. As for the Scottish ones who didn't attend - my utter contempt

#Trident Some of the arguments for retaining WMD sound like those that might be advanced by not very bright, morally deficient adolescents.

#Trident #indy #WMD Trident debate 20 Jan 2015: Angus Robertson - Part One. Angus Robertson on superb form ..

JOAN RUDDOCK: Nuclear weapons have no utility.They cannot be used to advance any cause or to secure any territory without devastating effects”

#Trident There's a grinning ghost missing from Labour benches - Jim Murphy, arch-Blairite, Henry Jackson nuclear hawk. Will he vote tonight?

#Trident I continue to marvel at what prats some English Tories are, e.g. Julian Fellows.

#indy George Osborne effectively confirmed today that he wants to see English Votes for English Laws (EVEL) applied to parts of the Budget

#Trident The argument for having nuclear weapons is identical to the NRA's case for every American family to keep an arsenal in their homes

#Trident Thanks God Labour has a tiny number of principled MPs left. Dame Joan Ruddock is one. Currently on her principled feet ...

#Trident Michael Fallon, in between defending WMD as a job creation scheme, attacks Labour's alleged equivalence on at sea nuclear deterrent

#Trident If ever we needed evidence that Labour and Tories are unfit to govern a civilised society, Trident debate offers it in abundance.

#indy Which is the more contemptible - Labour's loss of values and principles, or its attempt to hide the loss from the electorate by lies?

#indy Labour MPs absence from Trident debate says that they support WMD but are afraid to be seen to be doing so, afraid to debate. Feart.

#indy Survation poll this morning shows a majority of those who expressed a view are opposed to the renewal of the Trident nuclear weapons.

Ed Miliband is not a deal-making kind of guy–but he’ll do one post-GE2015!

Better mute the "pooling and sharing" bit with Scotland as you get closer to May 7th, Ed - the English electorate won't like it!

Get elected as a minority government, then do your deal with the SNP, Plaid and Greens - dump Trident, give the Scots what they were promised - devomax - then work with your new partners to undo the untold damage done by Blair, Brown and the Coalition to the people of these islands.

P.S. We'll be back sometime in the very near future for our independence after the next referendum that Scotland holds - without asking anyone's permission.

Murphy’s Big Idea – a flawed concept

It should be evident to all but the most blinkered right-wing Murphy media fan that Jimbo is not a deep thinker.

Despite presenting a media persona that affects profundity in its body language, Murphy is devoid of content – he’s a superficial, headline-grabbing soundbyte politician. You will search in vain for his deep thoughts in writing or in YouTube archives – Murphy’s tools are the ingratiating motherhood statement - oozing vague social concerns and that nauseating brand of Scottish Labour faux internationalism - alternating with a hectoring, blustering approach honed in long university student politics (at the taxpayers expense) and in the smoke-filled rooms of West of Scotland Labour politics, red in tooth and claw.

His core problem in trying to reverse his party’s fortunes before GE2015 is that of Scottish Labour epitomised in one man – the belief that values, policies and principles are coins that can be flipped over after the toss without the electorate noticing.

Time is running out fast for Jim – he was dumped by Miliband from his cabinet and from the shadow defence post that gave him his credibility in the Henry Jackson Society. His two mentors and role models – Tony Blair and David Miliband – are no longer around to support his right-wing HJS agenda of WMD and aggressive transatlantic US/UK hawkish foreign policy. He backed the wrong horse, the wrong Miliband in the Labour leadership election.

For a conviction politician, such setbacks would be a problem, but not for Jim Murphy, who is George Galloway in spirit, but without Galloway’s undoubted intellect and rhetorical gifts. Like Galloway, facing a declining career on the margins of Westminster politics, he looked north during the referendum campaign, and reached for his Irn-Bru crate.

Here was his big chance to grab media headlines and ingratiate himself, not only with Labour, Miliband, Brown and Darling et al, but with the right-wing unionist British Establishment and its shadowy international allies who held the key to the career path he probably aspired to – the Mandelsonian, Blairite, Robertsonish, David Milibandish high road to an international stage and the glittering prizes that awaited him.

It seemed to work, despite the eggings. The media began to call him a big beast, his face was everywhere. The plan seemed to be working. The NO vote prevailed. He seemed oblivious to the fact that the people of Glasgow were not too happy with him – indeed he wore their contempt as a badge of honour – and not even the fact that Glasgow voted YES, that Glasgow was YES City dented his complacency.

But it became evident even to a man as self-absorbed as Murphy that, post-referendum, a sea change had occurred in Scottish politics and the Scottish electorate, and things were not going according to plan. Scottish Labour – his party, was in a parlous state, as poll after poll chronicled their decline, while the SNP was doubling, then trebling, then quadrupling its membership.

As his allies melted away – Brown and Darling slinking off the stage  - and as his Scottishness became a poisoned pill in London Labour’s electoral strategy – and as the British Establishment and their media shills displayed utter confusion and bafflement over why the Scots hadn’t just rolled over and peed up their bellies in craven submission after the indyref, his Westminster career looked even more uncertain and his Scottish heartland was moving en masse to the SNP and the other independence parties.

Could he rely on the former solidly Tory East Renfrewshire electorate to still stand behind his right-wing agenda – pro-Israel, pro-NATO, pro-HJS values, pro-WMD – or would they be affected by the great tectonic movement sweeping Scottish politics?

London Labour wanted none of him, an uncertain future faced him after May 2015. His Westminster defence contacts were diluted and fading fast, and the revolving doors out of the Commons and into armaments industry, commerce, non-exec directorships and consulting contract, open to many in his position, didn’t seem to be spinning invitingly in his direction. But Johann Lamont really focused his mind, in the manner of her resignation.

Time to flip the coin – time to re-invent, re-focus – time to get the tartan carpetbag out of the closet. He threw his hat in the ring for the Scottish Labour Leadership, won convincingly and the new Murphy emerged from the Tardis, swathed in tartan habiliments, now claiming to be of the Left, and militantly anti-London Labour.

But there was the inconvenient baggage of his Blairite past and the dumbells of Scottish Labour’s core referendum arguments to fall over at every turn – Iraq, support for Trident, faux internationalism, unionism and the pooling and sharing mantra.

The motherhood statements and the shining, but suitably vague social vision were wearing thin as the general election campaign loomed. Something headline-grabbing that resembled a policy had to be found, and what better one, in the grip of winter and both Scottish and rUK NHSs under severe resource challenges, than a bidding challenge on nurses to fire at the SNP.

The SNP were in government, forced to balance budgets squeaking under the strain of cuts caused by Labour, LibDem and Tory incompetence, but Jimbo didn’t have to deal with the real life! All he needed, as ever, was a gimmick …

THE THOUSAND NURSES AND THE MANSION TAX

Murphy’s thought processes, as outlined by him and by enthusiastic and admiring journalists and commentators (almost all from the right of the political spectrum) with as little understanding of post-indyref politics as himself, ran as follows -

1. The SNP is past the post-indyref honeymoon period, needs to defend its record, and show why problems exists in areas under its devolved control, especially the NHS.

2. To play down his right-wing unionist London-Labour past, and to kill the Lamont branch office label, he has to demonstrate independence of Westminster Labour, and make a big gesture of defiance.

3. Nurses, and the pressure on nursing staff, are one of the key problems in both NHSs, and nurses always elicit public sympathy and support.

4. Since real policy formation, rigorous thought and economic rationality are not in Jimbo’s skillset, a simple outbidding ploy was needed. 1000 is a nice round figure (e.g. 1000 extra policemen a la SNP 2007-2011) and 1000 extra nurses is even nicer.

So – Murphy as FM would match any SNP staffing commitment by promising 1000 nurses on top of it.  But how to fund it? Easy – the mansion tax, popular on the left, unpopular on the right. Bash the rich, fund more nurses. In the Jim Murphy Ladybird Book of Politics, this was a nice wee simple story to feed a gullible Scottish electorate, especially the fabled 200,000 older Labour voters who were going to swing the election his way.

But this would offend London Labour and Westminster, since it would be essentially the London mansion owners who would fund it. Simples! Let them be offended – this would demonstrate that born-again socialist, Scottish Murphy is not afraid to put Scotland first and take the branch office sign down.

What’s wrong with this? Just about everything …

THE WORMS IN THE MURPHY APPLE

1. The Scottish electorate are no longer the gullible, reflex Labour-voting automatons that Labour relied on for generations – honed on the grindstone of the referendum campaign, they are now politically aware, social media adept, engaged, articulate and sceptical – and organised.

2. The pooling and sharing rationale, worked to death by Murphy et al during the indyref campaign, was never credible to YES supporters, and never mattered to rUK voters – except the ill-informed – because in practice, it didn’t work that way.

But in the post-indyref climate of rUK electorate resentment against Scottish vibrancy after defeat, SNP resurgence and the Smith Commission, a major sense of resentment and inequality was building over what was perceived as bribes to Scots losers.

And now pooling and sharing was expected to favour already bribed Scots and the Scottish NHS over the rUK electorate and the rUK NHS with English - nay, London! - house owners taxes!

This was guaranteed to upset just about everybody, except the right-wing media claque for Murphy. The Tories wouldn’t like it, Londoners of all shades of political allegiance wouldn’t like it, and for Miliband’s Labour Party in electioneering mode, it would be folly to endorse it.

But crucially, the Scottish electorate that Murphy hopes to con with his pledge know that he can’t deliver it without the support of Westminster, which won’t be forthcoming – and that it’s therefore an empty gesture.

And empty gestures are the essence of Jim Murphy …

Coalitus and coalascere

Coalitus? Sounds painful – maybe an inflammation caused by household fuel? Or is it a fancy name for the food craving of some pregnant women?

And coalascere ? Something Il commissario Montalbano might order as a side dish in his favourite Sicilian restaurant?

No – coalitus is the medieval Latin past participle of coalescere, meaning fusion or a coming together and coalesce and coalition derive from it.

A coalition is an alliance of some sort between two or more parties for combined action in concert in certain defined circumstances, one that is usually intended to be temporary.

Used in a political context, it is often for the purpose of forming a government.

(I am familiar with it in a negotiating context in voting behaviours with individuals and groups,  and the mathematical horrors of The Banzhaf Dilemma that I used to frighten senior managers with on negotiating skills courses.)

COALITION GOVERNMENT

We have lived with a coalition government in the UK for over four years in the form of the pernicious Tory/LibDem Coalition of 2010, formed in the aftermath of economic, social and foreign policy shambles left by the Blair/Brown governments of 1997 to 2010.

If we go back to 1852, the Peelites and the Whigs formed a coalition headed by Lord Aberdeen. It lasted till 1855. The noble Earl had a rash of Lords and knights in his cabinet, but he also had one William Ewart Gladstone, a fellow Peelite, of whom rather a lot was subsequently heard.

There was another short-lived LibTory coalition right in the middle of the Great War after the Gallipoli disaster: it collapsed and was promptly replaced by another under Lloyd George. It fell apart in 1922 over scandals, notoriously the blatant flogging of peerages for hard cash by Lloyd George.

The coalitions of 1931 to 1940 preferred to call themselves National Governments because by that time the term Coalition Government had a bad name(!)

The Second World War brought a Tory-led coalition under Churchill (1940-1945). It was referred to as the War Ministry, and last until May 1945, when Churchill resigned after the war ended.

It was replaced by the Churchill caretaker ministry until July 1945, when the general election resulted in a Labour landslide and the Attlee Government.

One might therefore say that the record of coalition governments has not been a stellar one, with the exception of the War Ministry Coalition of 1940-1945.

I’ve been alive during three of the six of them, witnessed the end of two of them and hope to witness the end of another on May 7th 2015.

The question is – will we see another coalition government sometime after May 8th 2015 – and should we want one?

SNP Westminster strategy

The SNP’s core strategy for GE2015 is to contest all Westminster Scottish seats and get as many SNP MPs elected as possible.

Its preferred outcome for the UK-wide ballot is Labour as the party with the largest number of seats, but without an overall majority, and the end of Cameron’s Tory/LibDem Coalition Government.

This outcome would leave UK Labour with three choices -

govern as a minority government, with no formal arrangement with any other party, but making ad hoc deals to secure a majority on specific votes with any party or group of MPs it could secure

enter into a confidence and supply arrangement with a party or parties to offer committed support on agreed issues

form a coalition government with one or more parties and form a cabinet that included ministers appointed from those parties

It would however be a mistake to think that this would all instantly be Ed Miliband’s choice to make. As Gus O’Donnell, the Cabinet Secretary involved in the 2010 untidy and acrimonious negotiations that led to the Cameron/Clegg Coalition, has pointed out on Sky News, things were not as straightforward in 2010, and are unlikely to be straightforward after May 7th 2015.

But if it is Miliband’s choice, and he chooses a deal rather than minority government, and if the logic of that deal centres on a new and impressive bloc of SNP MPs, what deal might he choose – confidence and supply or coalition ?

If I were in his shoes, and I wanted to neuter the SNP influence in Westminster, I would unhesitatingly choose coalition.

Why?

Well, for a number of reasons.

1. I would invoke the spirit and the words of Lyndon Johnson when faced with having J.Edgar Hoover in or out of his government – “I’d rather have them inside the tent pissing out than outside the tent pissing in.”

2. Having the SNP in government, in cabinet – and with cabinet responsibility -could be presented as de facto acceptance of the finality of the 2014 independence referendum outcome and embracing the Union.

3. If the SNP broke ranks in coalition, and breached joint cabinet responsibility for a policy decision or action, they could be presented as deeply irresponsible and unfit for government.

4. In Miliband’s position, I would rely on the seductive influences of ministerial office, the status and perks, and the illusion of acting on an international stage to blunt the edge of the SNP’s ambitions for Scotland and damage their reputation and electoral standing with their core constituency.

In a nutshell, if I were Ed Miliband I would do to the SNP what Cameron has done to the LibDems – reduce them to an object of contempt and an electoral rump of a party.

In contrast, governing UK as a minority government would be a far more risky enterprise than governing Scotland in a devolved Parliament was for Alex Salmond 2007-2011, and a confidence and supply deal would place him in the mode of supplicant every time a significant vote arose and crucially, at every budget.

SNP CHOICE?

The SNP’s current position – as I understand it – is that they hope for a Labour win with no overall majority, and a subsequent confidence and supply deal. If - as many thought – Stewart Hosie was flying a cautious kite for coalition, then it is for the SNP to justify such a course of action.

But can they – and more importantly – will they?

The SNP could argue that it cannot commit to what it would and wouldn’t do until the result of GE2015 is known. That is true up to a point, and the SNP - and Alex Salmond’s - legendary pragmatism card would be played. It takes two to tango, and this tango might include more than two, and shift towards a threesome - or a foursome reel.

However, the SNP has found no problem in specifically excluding any kind of a deal with the Tories or UKIP in stating its forward intentions for GE2015. There is nothing that I can see that stops them precluding a coalition with Labour either, but pursuing a confidence and supply deal.

My guess is that the SNP ministers, MSPs and the Parliamentary candidates have their brief by now on how to play this at the hustings and with the media, and it will be a stonewalling response – “impossible to say at this stage, situation will have to be evaluated after May 7th, wouldn’t want to tie the party’s hands, too much at stake …” etc.

The fate of Craig Murray over a vetting question will not have escaped the candidates, and I would guess they’ll be right on message on this hot potato. Not one will say they’re opposed on principle to a coalition.

Is this the right approach? Only the electorate can answer that. I’m opposed to a coalition, but even the SNP publicly stating they fully intended to pursue one wouldn’t stop me voting SNP on 7th May. But I’d be worried if they did, and I believe there are some former Labour voters who shifted painfully to the SNP, with many reservations and much personal agony, who might react differently.

As I said in a tweet on the day Stewart Hosie appeared to raise the coalition question – I want SNP arses on the green benches post-May 7th, but I don’t want them on the front benches of the Westminster Parliament we campaigned so hard to get out of.

The People’s choice –an ideal that fails against reality of Party?

JOHN ADAMS:

There is nothing which I dread so much as a division of the republic into two great parties, each arranged under its leader, and concerting measures in opposition to each other. This,  in my humble apprehension, is to be dreaded as the greatest political evil under our Constitution.

GEORGE WASHINGTON:

the common and continual mischiefs of the spirit of party are sufficient to make it the interest and duty of a wise people to discourage and restrain it.

POLITICAL PARTIES

The Founding Fathers of America were uneasy about them. Democracies the world over are stuck with them, for better or worse. Political theorists argue endlessly about them. PPE graduates talk glibly about them. What in hell are they?

Wikipedia offers general definitions -

WIKIPEDIA

A political party is an organization of people which seeks to achieve goals common to its members through the acquisition and exercise of political power.

A political party platform or platform is a list of the values and actions which are supported by a political party or individual candidate, in order to appeal to the general public, for the ultimate purpose of garnering the general public's support and votes about complicated topics or issues.

So there we have it. Simples? No - there’s an inconvenient reality for political parties, democracy.

In turn, political parties are an inconvenient reality for democracies.

How to get to the heart of the complex questions surrounding democracy and the role of political parties? A few simple ideas – all relating to Westminster elections.

1. Our UK democracy allows the citizen to vote for a candidate for the Westminster Parliament. Any citizen qualified by law (not by party!) may stand for Parliament.

2. A candidate may elect to stand under a political party label – if that party agrees – or stand as an independent. If the candidate stands under a party label, the party is identified on the ballot paper.

3. Political parties must have processes to identify potential candidates, nominate them for assessment, assess them, and decide if they are to be adopted as a prospective Parliamentary candidate.

Let’s pause here and look at the implication of the above three facts -

Democracy depends on named individual citizens being elected to represent defined constituencies. The voter gets therefore to choose between the candidates presented on the ballot paper – but not to choose which candidates are on the ballot paper in the first place.

Whether a candidate appears on the ballot paper is determined by one of two scenarios -

his or her decision to stand as an independent candidate in a parliamentary constituency.

A political party’s decision to allow them to stand – after evaluation and assessment - as the sole candidate for that party in that constituency.

In the first scenario, a citizen offers himself/herself for election by secret ballot to his/her fellow citizens.

In the second scenario, the voter is offered a candidate chosen by a political party.

The voter is both cases may evaluate the candidate against his/her own criteria by the means available – the candidate’s individual background, qualifications, experience, values, principles and objectives as offered by the candidate and by personal research.

In the second case – the candidate has also been approved by the political party’s selection process.

One might characterises this as being offered a meal cooked by the person offering it, or by a meal offered by a well-know restaurant chain – a unique meal or a branded meal. In the first case, knowledge of the individual is vital. In the second case, the reputation of the brand is crucial.

This brings us sharply up against the role of party in politics.

Imagine a Westminster Parliament convening for the first time comprised of nothing but independents – candidates who offered themselves to the electorate without the involvement of any party machine. 650 individuals, expected to collectively govern a United(?) Kingdom comprising four bits – England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland - but elected by a much smaller group (their constituents).

A crucial decision has to be made immediately – say a decision to go to war, or refrain.

They could debate at once – if they could agree the terms of reference and when to start the debate.  Such a debate would make PMQs look like a Sunday school picnic.

They could then move to a vote – providing they could agree when the debate had ended. A truly democratic decision would be then be made, if the enemy had not yet launched their attack.

Let’s say they approved the war.

A whole set of new decisions would have to be voted on after lengthy debate. By that time, the United Kingdom would have either been overrun by the enemy or obliterated – or taken over by a military coup by impatient generals.

An extreme scenario – but a real possibility. The point is that, even in the absence of immediate crises,  such a Parliament would speedily have itself organised into factions of similar mind and rapidly thereafter into political parties.

Party is inevitable in democratic politics if anything is to be done – unless, as Frances Fukuyama points out, a fully functioning and powerful bureaucratic and military state under a rule of law was already in place before democracy ever emerged, and the elected representatives were either content to let it run things pro-tem – or were afraid to challenge it.

So, practically, nothing gets done without party, and a party - or parties - able to command a majority on key issues in a vote, i.e. to form a government.

What has all this got to do with recent events in and around Holyrood?

THE SNP and CANDIDATE SELECTION PROCEDURES

By the 2007 election, the SNP was a tightly-disciplined machine with a modest membership, significantly the creation of Alex Salmond and his key supporters and advisers.

But – a personal view – its candidate selection process for Westminster elections and in local council elections often produced abysmal results, notably in Glasgow. Some selections (no, I won’t be specific!) were only explicable by either rewarding of loyal time-servers, or seriously deficient selection processes – or perhaps even a lack of suitable candidates.

But despite these failings, the party machine in Scotland delivered - in Holyrood - two terms of government (second on a landslide 2011 victory), negotiated a legal referendum, and took Scotland to the brink of independence. These were formidable achievements by any standard.

The post-indyref events are even more astonishing – the fivefold membership growth, successive positive polls, the resurgence of the YES spirit, a vibrant, popular and respected new First Minister and the humbling of the opposition parties.

It was immediately evident that the spectacular growth in SNP membership post-indyref would offer huge opportunities to the Party, but also pose challenges. Nicola recognised this instantly, and responded rapidly by opening up the way for new members to offer themselves as candidates for the immediate challenge – GE2015 – and for Holyrood in 2016.

There can also be little doubt that this sent a chill down the spine of two categories of party members: long-serving,  worthy activists who had paid their dues to the party and aspired to candidate selection and the party favourites – talented activists, not necessarily long-standing members, who were being assiduously groomed for imminent stardom, many of whom had made their bones during the long referendum campaign.

It is probably fair to say of the second category that their backers were more than a little uneasy about the prospect of their protégés being challenged by the nouvelle vague.

THE TWO HURDLES

The process for vetting and selecting candidates (set out in full in the Appendix below) provides for -

A national register of approved potential parliamentary and local government candidates to be created and maintained by the SNP National Executive Committee

The individual SNP branch may only nominate, and its members select their parliamentary and local government candidates from this approved list.

So, before a candidate gets anywhere near the ballot paper and the electorate, he or she must leap two hurdles – a selection committee appointed by the National Executive, and then a vote of the constituency  branch members.

It is this first stage – and the appeal following it – that Craig Murray failed, and it is the conduct of the process and the alleged media briefings that he complains of, not the SNP’s right to vet him by such a process. His permanent blackballing as a candidate deserves closer examination.

Falkirk has been through all this relatively recently, with Jim Murphy and the Unite Union playing starring roles as competing villains  in the melodrama, with briefings and counter-briefings, against the flaming backdrop of the Grangemouth dispute.

Where do I stand on all of this?

For the record, if I had to choose between Craig Murray and Tasmina Ahmed-Sheikh (I don’t know who the other candidates are) I would choose choose Tasmina.

Do I see an alternative to such a party candidate vetting and selection process – two relatively undemocratic processes before the polling station and ultimate constituency voter choice?

No, I don’t, even though I don’t like the way it sometime operates.

Do I think the SNP is any better or any worse than any other party, any more or less democratic in such processes?

No, I don’t – I simply want them to observe the highest standards with such imperfect aspects of democracy.

Do I think Craig Murray has always acted wisely in his comments and blogs, both before and after the vetting process?

No, I don’t. I respect his moral courage, as a British career diplomat, in challenging the injustices of the system, and respect his stated principles, but I feel he has been injudicious in some statements.

But I don’t know who is to blame for the potentially damaging media coverage this debacle threatens, or who released the cat from the bag in the first place. I think the SNP needs to be more transparent - as a matter of urgency - on candidate vetting and selection, and more careful in their press contacts on such matters.

God knows, the electorate of Falkirk deserves better than this.

 

APPENDIX ONE – extract from SNP - Rules and Standing Orders

Rules on Vetting and Selection of Potential Parliamentary and Local  Government Candidates

1. Introduction
1.1 The Scottish National Party will encourage a diverse range of members, with a broad mix of skills, understanding and experience, to apply for consideration as potential parliamentary and local government candidates. The vetting or assessment of members for consideration as potential parliamentary and local government candidates will be carried out by the Candidate Assessment Panel appointed by the National Executive Committee (hereafter referred to as “the Panel”).

A national register of approved potential parliamentary and local government candidates will be created and maintained by the National Executive Committee, from which branches will be able to nominate and members select their parliamentary and local government candidates. At all times through this process, the principles and practice of ensuring equality of opportunity for all will be promoted.

2. Mainstreaming Equality of Opportunity

2.1 The National Executive Committee shall establish and maintain a strategy to deliver equality of opportunity throughout the party, including in the selection of candidates for local government and parliamentary elections. The equality strategy will focus primarily on increasing the representation of women, ethnic minority and disabled members throughout the party, and will aim to ensure the SNP fields a more balanced list of candidates in future. Support will be offered to branches and other local organisations to ensure equality of opportunity at grassroots level. The equality strategy will aim to recruit and retain more members from underrepresented groups; to encourage active participation by these members at all levels in the party; to increase the number of candidates drawn from underrepresented groups; and to monitor progress on achieving these aims. As part of the equality strategy, the National Executive Committee shall agree a plan for each election, which may include the use of specific mechanisms, such as hard targets or other measures to deliver a balanced list of candidates. Any specific mechanism will require the approval of National Council before being introduced. Vetting of Potential Candidates

3. Candidate Assessment Panel Candidate Assessment Panel

3.1 The remit, conduct and procedures of the Candidate Assessment Panel will be established and amended from time to time by the National Executive Committee.

3.2 The Panel will be responsible for organising Assessment Centres for vetting of potential candidates.

4. Assessment Criteria

4.1 The National Executive Committee will set down the assessment criteria for potential parliamentary and local government candidates. The Panel will undertake assessment of potential parliamentary and local government candidates in accordance with the National Executive Committee’s guidance. The Panel will make recommendations to the National Executive. The recommendation can only be to approve or not to approve a member as a potential parliamentary or local government candidate.

4.2 The National Executive Committee’s assessment criteria shall, on the advice of the Panel, ensure that there is no discrimination on the grounds of age, gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, race, disability and/or religious belief.

4.3 The Panel, following a decision to approve or not approve a member as a potential parliamentary or local government candidate, will produce a feedback report summarising individual performance, including justification for the decision and proposals for personal development, if required.

5. Code of Conduct

5.1 Each member who applies to be considered as a potential parliamentary or local government candidate is required to sign a code of conduct, which will govern their behaviour as an approved potential local government candidate.

5.2 Each member who applies to be considered as a potential parliamentary or local government candidate is required to sign the relevant SNP Group Standing Orders.

6. Approval of potential candidates

6.1 The National Executive Committee will accept the recommendations of the Panel unless two-thirds of all possible members of the National Executive Committee decide otherwise. The National Executive Committee can only approve or not approve the recommendation of the Panel.

6.2 Any member who has been approved by the National Executive Committee as a potential parliamentary candidate will automatically be considered as an approved potential local government candidate. The member is required to satisfy the Local Government Liaison Committee (or body with responsibility for council elections) that they are eligible for nomination as a council candidate in that local government area as the law currently stands.

7. Appeal

7.1 A member who has not been approved as a potential parliamentary or local government candidate may appeal to the National Executive Committee’s Election Appeals Committee in accordance with procedures approved by the National Executive Committee. The decision of the Election Appeals Committee is final.

8. Register Register of Approved Potential Candidates

8.1 The National Executive Committee shall establish and maintain a single Register of Approved Potential Parliamentary and Local Government Candidates, listing in said register whether members have been approved as potential candidates for local government, parliament or both. This register will be made available on the members section of the SNP website.

8.2 The Panel will review the register on an annual basis in accordance with procedures and guidance approved by the National Executive Committee.

9. Removal from the Register of Approved Potential Candidates

9.1 The National Executive Committee may remove a member approved as a potential parliamentary candidate from the Register of Approved Potential Parliamentary and Local Government Candidates on the recommendation of the Panel, on the grounds that the member has either:

i) breached the Code of Conduct of an Approved Potential Parliamentary or Local Government Candidate, and/or

ii) breached the Disciplinary Rules of the Party. 9.2 and their removal is the recommendation of either:

i) a Liaison Committee, with responsibility for a parliamentary election, resolution passed at a duly constituted Special meeting, or

ii) a Constituency Association (or Constituency Branch) resolution passed at a duly constituted Special meeting, and/or

iii) in the case of 9.1 ii), the National Secretary, following a report of the Disciplinary Committee.

9.3 The National Executive Committee may remove a member approved as a potential local government candidate from the Register of Approved Parliamentary and Local Government Candidates on the grounds on the recommendation of the Panel, on the grounds that the member has either:

i) breached the code of conduct of an approved potential local government candidate, and/or

ii) breached the disciplinary rules of the Party.

9.4 and their removal is the recommendation of either:

i) a branch resolution passed at a duly constituted Special meeting, or

ii) a Local Government Liaison Committee (or body with responsibility for council elections) resolution passed at a duly constituted Special meeting, and/or

iii) in the case of 9.3 ii), the National Secretary, following a report of the Disciplinary Committee.

9.5 There is no appeal against the decision of the National Executive Committee on removal of a member from the Register of Approved Potential Parliamentary or Local Government Candidates. A member may be eligible to re-apply for consideration as a potential parliamentary or local government candidate on the guidance of the Panel. Selection of Parliamentary Candidates

10. Number of Candidates per Constituency

10.1 The Organisation Convener will make a recommendation to the National Executive Committee on the number of parliamentary candidates that will be nominated by the Party in each constituency at a parliamentary election.

11. Responsibility for Selection of Parliamentary Candidates

11.1 Constituency Associations (or a Constituency Branch) will have responsibility for overseeing the selection of Scottish Parliamentary candidates subject to National Executive Committee approval of the selection and subject also to the role of Party Headquarters in overseeing postal ballots and related matters, and to the provision which the constitution makes for the National Secretary and Business Convener to select candidates in specified circumstances.

11.2 Liaison Committees for elections to the United Kingdom Parliament (or Constituency Associations which have been given responsibility for Westminster elections by the National Executive Committee) will have responsibility for overseeing the selection of United Kingdom Parliamentary candidates subject to National Executive Committee approval of the selection.

11.3 The National Executive Committee will have responsibility for the selection procedures for the European Parliamentary elections.

12. Timetable for Selection of Parliamentary Candidates

12.1 Each Constituency Association or Liaison Committee with responsibility for parliamentary elections will agree a timetable for the nomination of parliamentary candidate(s) for the constituency which they are responsible for, in accordance with any procedures approved by the National Executive Committee.

13. Nomination of Parliamentary Candidates

13.1 The procedure for nominations shall be as determined by the National Executive Committee.

 14. Selection of Parliamentary Candidates

14.1 Only members who reside and are on the Electoral Register in the electoral constituency can vote in the selection of a parliamentary candidate(s) in accordance with the procedures approved by the National Executive Committee.

14.2 Only members who have maintained their membership for thirteen months prior to a cut off date agreed by the National Executive Committee are entitled to vote in the selection for a parliamentary candidate.

14.3 All selections of parliamentary candidates will be carried out on the basis of one-member-one-vote using the principles of single transferable voting. Members will be made aware of the Scottish National Party’s commitment to equality of opportunity and the need to ensure a broad mix of parliamentarians are elected to represent the diverse communities of Scotland.

14.4 The National Secretary and Business Convener, in using their powers to select a parliamentary candidate in the circumstances specified in the Constitution, shall do so after consultation with the Constituency Association, Constituency Branch or Liaison Committee concerned or, in the case of selections of European Parliamentary candidates, with members of the National Executive Committee.

14.5 A ballot of all members in a constituency will not be required in the event that a candidate is unopposed for selection in a constituency. The NEC will make rules to cover selection procedure in these instances.

14.6 The National Executive Committee will have responsibility for the selection and ranking procedures for parliamentary regional lists.

14.6 The National Executive Committee shall bring forward additions and/or amendment(s) to these Rules in order to specify processes for ensuring a balanced list of candidates, particularly in regard to gender, for each parliamentary election.

15. Deselection of Parliamentary Candidates

15.1 A candidate for the Scottish or United Kingdom Parliament, whether in a constituency or on a party list, may be deselected by the National Executive Committee on a vote of two thirds of those present, if acting on the request of the Constituency Association or Liaison Committee concerned. The National Secretary may delegate the function of assessing such a request to a panel of National Executive Committee members, who will then report their findings to the National Executive Committee for decision.

15.2 A candidate for the European Parliament may be deselected by the National Executive Committee, by a two-thirds majority of those voting, if acting on the request of the National Secretary and Business Convener.

15.3 If a parliamentary candidate on a party list dies, resigns or is deselected as a list candidate, or becomes ineligible to be an SNP candidate, then any other candidates below him or her on the list each move up one place in the rankings.

Let’s make it a really Happy, Labour-free New Year in May 2015

A guid New Year tae ane an a’ when it comes – an’ mony may ye see!

Campaign for – and vote for – an independence-supporting party in GE2o15

**a YES party**

best wishes,

Peter

Sundry reflections

QUEEN STREET

The Scottish news is consumed by one awful event. There is little I can say that can add anything useful to sentiments already expressed or to the analysis and speculation on  events and causes of this terrible human tragedy, other than that it appears to be one of those horrific random events that periodically wreak such damage on the lives of people.

Like everyone else, I now feel guilt in pursuing mundane activities, especially at this time of year, while such grief afflicts others, yet I must. But my thought are with the bereaved.

READING

The referendum campaign consumed much of my energies over recent years, and I mean not just the official campaign, but the one that effectively started when a nationalist – and I use the word proudly with no equivocation – government was elected in 2007.

Along with thousands of Scots like me, my planned activities for this phase of my life – reading, writing and music - were sort of put on hold, or at least relegated to second place.

But now that things have calmed down, there’s more time and space, so I’ve made a 175-page dent in the intimidating 658 pages of Francis Fukuyama’s Political Order and Political Decay, and revisited old friends, including Eric Hoffer’s The True Believer, Robert Louis Stevenson’s Kidnapped (my all-time favourite book), Raymond Chandler’s short stories, American Popular Song by Alex Wilder and as bedtime reading, Alistair Cooke’s collected Letters from America.

(I also re-read The Ancient Order of Moridura periodically, but that’s a sort of masochistic vice.)

The Alistair Cooke collection I’m reading for the fourth time, and I find it infinitely rewarding. Cooke was born in 1908 in Salford, Manchester and died in 2004. The classic Anglo-American, his first Letter from America came in 1946, and he was a part of my life in his BBC broadcasts from my childhood up until his death. He chronicled all the great political events of the twentieth century, and his unique insights into America, American life and Americans were delivered in an inimitable prose style, carried by an inimitable voice in his broadcasts.

I’m back in 1956 with him at the moment, as he writes of the death of the grand old man of American letters, H.L. Mencken, the Sage of Baltimore. Apart from giving me another title for my re-reading list, his HLM: RIP essay came up with this strangely comforting quote on death from Mencken -

“… the dying man doesn’t struggle much, and he isn’t afraid. … he succumbs to a blest stupidity. His mind fogs. His will power vanishes. He submits decently. He scarcely gives a damn.”

I know not all deaths are like that, but only a man who had been close to death himself could have written that. It mirrors closely how I felt in the lead-up to my own cardiac arrest in 2010 and my subsequent six minutes of ‘death’ before resuscitation.

But here I am, almost five years on – five good years – and looking forward to Christmas, and New Year and the May general election, and an SNP landslide – and ultimately independence.

Thinking the Unthinkable - first published 22nd December 2014

During the long referendum campaign, online commentators such as myself had to think hard about the potential negative impact on YES of raising certain questions, offering certain opinions, addressing certain topics, voicing certain criticisms, and the wisdom of giving them “the oxygen of publicity”.

The campaign inevitably polarised opinion, and given the tsunami of abuse and misinformation thrown at YES by the Better Together campaign, the might of the UK unionist media and the Whitehall and the Treasury machines, I was reluctant, like many others, to risk giving ammunition to the other side.

But this instinct had to be rationally balanced against to need to correct perceived inaccuracies and damaging beliefs (I mean as perceived by me) that, if not countered, would have pernicious effects on our struggle for the independence vote. This led me into difficult waters over, for example, the BBC and NATO, where I felt I was serving the cause more effectively by speaking out than maintaining a silence. The question of BBC bias – where I took the position that, although there were many specific examples of blatant bias, the BBC was not the devil incarnate, and much of its output was not only objective, but absolutely vital to informing the electorate – was a long running war with other YES supporters, many of whom I had, and still have the highest respect for.

NATO was a much more difficult one – it was a fundamental point of principle for me (and a few others) and it produced some very bitter attacks on me by email and online. It divided the Party at Conference, and it led to my resignation from the SNP. Post referendum, I’ve bitten that bullet and rejoined, not because I’m reconciled to NATO membership, but because post-indyref politics have shifted its significance – for the moment.

On the monarchy, as a republican by conviction I was prepared to accept the FM’s position of constitutional monarchy, believing it was a realpolitik price worth paying to get a YES. Now, after the putative Queen of Scots’ unwise indyref intervention, I’m not sure it was – or is.

THE NEW INDY POLITICS

A few months before the 18th September, I offered an algorithm to a highly-respected media contact – one I now regard as a friend – setting out what I saw as the possible results of various indyref outcomes. I won’t reproduce it here – suffice it to say,  outcomes I didn’t forecast were

The Vow

First Minister’s resignation after a NO vote

the unprecedented surge in SNP membership

High YES supporter morale

inexorable SNP poll gains

the launch of a new Scottish newspaper, The National, supporting independence.

Neither did anybody else!

The new post-indyref politics are normal party politics resumed, but in a highly volatile and unpredictable UK political context, with the immediate focus on the general election 2015 (GE2015) and the 2016 Scottish Parliamentary elections.

I think it’s fair to say that not all YES supporters are entirely comfortable in the new political climate. Having flocked to the SNP banner, and had the adrenalin rush of Nicola’s triumphal tour, indulged understandable schadenfreude at the uncomprehending splutters of indignation from the “winners” of the referendum, relaxed in a kind of post-coital phase, they’re now looking for action of the kind they grew accustomed to in the campaign.

Most have adjusted, thrown themselves into the new politics enthusiastically, battle-hardened, tempered in the indyref fires and ready to work for independence in a dazzling variety of new ways. But some are pining for the old binary certainties – clearly identifiable villains and heroes, and simple characterisations and choices – and are a bit lost. One dedicated indyref campaigner described himself to me as feeling ‘bereft’ at the void in his life since September.

And so to thinking the unthinkable …

Throughout the campaign, there was a strand of independence thought from supporters (never from politicians or party animals to my knowledge. and little from media commentators) on a taboo subject, UDI – a Unilateral Declaration of Independence.

Most of this, at least as I experienced it, as I carried out the tedious and sometimes depressing task of pre-moderating blog and YouTube comments and my email inbox, was adolescent nonsense, whatever the age of those articulating it. But some of it was rooted in deeper thinking about possible reactions to scenarios that could, at least in theory unfold.

I have some limited vicarious experience of historical UDI, though a Rhodesian connection and from those who were part of the Slovenian velvet revolution. And there was the very real situation and stark choices facing our staunch friends of Scotland in Galicia and Catalonia over their own referendum.

All of this came back to me in the last few days when a Danish friend, political contact and invaluable information source asked what kind of situation could give rise to a UDI in Scotland, even if I fundamentally rejected such a course of action – which I do.

Here is the answer I gave -

START

The only sequence of events that would provoke UDI I could foresee would be -

UK refusal to legitimise a referendum request

such a referendum then being held without a UK legal basis

a significant  majority resulting, in the order of, say, 65%/35%.

For such a scenario to unfold at all, it would probably have been preceded by a majority of Scottish Westminster seats having previously fallen to SNP and other Scottish indy-supporting parties - a possibility in the general election of May 2015.

However, it could not be a velvet revolution like, say, Slovenia's because of the massive disentanglement of institutions required - and the fundamental question of control of the Clyde nuclear base.

It would of course potentially provoke an immediate crisis of loyalty in the armed forces in Scotland, and the possible emergence of powerful anti-democratic forces, perhaps through the military establishment.

END

These conditions are unlikely to arise, in my view, and I hope they never do - in my lifetime or anyone else’s – but they are conceivable.

The much more likely scenario for GE2015 is significant Westminster seat gains, and a confidence and supply arrangement with Labour, either to permit them to form a minority Labour government a la Salmond  2007 in Holyrood, or to support them against a Tory/LibDem/UKIP coalition.

And on that note, I wish you a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year!

The Smith Commission–the “deal” and the fallout

Lord Smith of Kelvin - self-deprecating and modest about his role - appeared before the media in the National Museum of Scotland at around 9 o’clock on 27th November - flanked by the politician members of the Commission and key advisors - to announce that a deal had been arrived at on more powers for Scotland.

The BBC lead-in to this at 9.03 quoted from the multitude of leaks, hyping up the impending revelations by describing them as “the biggest transfer of powers since devolution began 15 years ago”, a factually accurate statement, but also the key UK propaganda sound byte attempting to airbrush out the the starkly evident fact that the powers fell far, far short of the various versions of The Vow, which ranged from vague promises through devomax to home rule and near-federalism, depending on which “promise” the electorate of Scotland listened to, in the last days of the referendum campaign.

Let’s take a step back and take a hard look at genesis of The Smith Commission …

THE SMITH COMMISSION

September: a single poll shows YES Campaign ahead for first time and throws the Unionist parties, Westminster, the British Establishment and the unionist media, i.e. virtually all of the media, into blind panic.

The YES Scotland campaign could actually win! Desperate measures were clearly called for. Cometh the panic, cometh the lies, cometh the media - and the man …

Having opposed the second question and ignored the blindingly obvious lessons of polls throughout the entire campaign - that there was a solid majority of Scots and Scottish institutions that wanted far great powers but within the UK - they faced a dilemma: how to belatedly capitalise on this whilst retaining sovereign control over Scotland and avoiding giving anything of significance away that could strike at the very concept of the Union.

Their solution, albeit panic-driven - and ignoring the UK-wide impact on the rUK electorate in the run-up to the 2015 General election - was to make non-specific yet sweeping promises of more powers in a way that could be controlled, watered down, and ideally kicked into the long, long Westminster and Whitehall grass after a NO vote.

(I was tweeting suspiciously about devo max, Civic Scotland and more powers as long ago as July 2012)

The plan arrived at was crude – but it worked. The Scottish unionist parties already had positions on more powers, albeit differing widely. The big question was not what the parties individually wanted, but whether they could get their act together, then persuade their Westminster party masters to endorse something nebulous but seductive before 18th September.

A compliant media channel was required to act as cheerleader. What better one than The Daily Record?

Now all that was needed to administer a coup-de-grace to YES hopes (by convincing the wavering Don’t Knows and the soft NOes) was a blunt instrument, in the form of someone who held -

no position in Better Together

no Government position

no Shadow Cabinet position

- a powerful voice who had no authority to commit anything on behalf of anyone, and who could be safely repudiated if things went pear-shaped with the rUK electorate.

And there he was, growling, pacing and posturing in the wings, moral compass needle swinging wildly in all directions, desperate for a platform – banker of the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars, proponent of light-touch banking regulation and the architect of the collapse of the UK economy – Gordon Brown.

It worked. The Referendum was lost, Better Together won by a comfortable margin, and joy was unbounded in the British Establishment, the House of Lords, NATO, the Pentagon, the White House, the Ministry of Defence, the nuclear industry, hedge-fund managers and dodgy bankers and just about every right-wing European country  – and perhaps even the Vatican?

But the piper, in the form of the electorate, had to be paid after a NO vote - the Vow had to appear to be fulfilled, since it was manifestly impossible to fulfil it without defenestrating the Union. But the plan was already in motion …

A respected Scottish figure had to be found, and a confidential approach was made to Lord Smith of Kelvin before the referendum. He accepted. The task was formidable, but the appointment was not a poisoned chalice, because if he succeeded in achieving a consensus recommendation from the Scottish Parties  including the independence parties – no mean feat – Lord Smith could then pass the chalice to Westminster, job done and conscience clear.

Then, and only then, would the chalice contents undergo a transformation into a drink that would enter the system of the English, Welsh and Northern Irish electorates and run in potentially toxic rivulets through the constitutional structure and the very heart of the Westminster system, even the very concept of Union itself.

SMITH COMMISSION BASIS

The Commission was set up by Cameron to consult widely then attempt to broker a consensus between representatives of the five political parties in the devolved Scottish Government on what additional powers should be granted to Scotland following a NO vote. Their recommendations would then be to the three leaders of the main UK parties, who were pre-committed by the Vow (and now by the terms of reference of the Smith Commission) to take the recommendations set out in the agreement and turn them into law.

The five party representatives de facto formed two blocs – the pro-independence bloc (2) and the Unionist block (3) and to be present at all, they had to fully accept the terms of reference set by Government for the Commission: recognition that Westminster Parliament was sovereign and crucially, that nothing in the submission would disadvantage rUK.

Since the prime reason the UK opposed Scottish independence was the undeniable fact that Scotland leaving the Union would damage the UK in fundamental areas : its world status, the nuclear deterrent, defence, economic and social policy – if they persisted with the centre-right consensus policies  of the three unionist parties and their concept of foreign affairs and strategic defence – the likelihood of new powers even approximating to the wild promises of the VOW was close to zero.

After all, wasn’t that exactly why the Second Question had been blocked by the UK Government?

SMITH: CHOICES FACED BY SNP/GREENS BLOC 

In his foreword to his 27th November Report, Lord Smith reiterated what the purpose of the Commission had been.

Scotland voted ‘No’, but it did so with each of the three main UK parties promising more powers for the Scottish Parliament. I was asked to lead a Commission, working with the five parties represented in the Scottish Parliament, to agree what those new powers should be.

The words I have highlighted in red should, of course, have read

..to agree what we, the Scottish  Parliament representatives, think those new powers ought to be, and then submit our consensus view to the British Government and sovereign UK Parliament in the hope that they will ratify them.

The reality of this for the Unionist bloc of three was that nothing could be submitted that hadn’t been cleared at every step of the way with Westminster, however that was done – overtly or covertly. The idea that the Commission would deliberate in monastic seclusion, only revealing their consensus to an admiring world on 27th November was always risible, as leaks and last minute events demonstrated.

The Smith recommendations required a UK imprimatur before they were released, not after.

The Commission was always going to be an adversarial multi-party negotiation, with Lord Smith as mediator. Whether the party representatives were equipped for such a complex negotiating process is an open question.

I will not speculate on what the Greens choice’s were, nor how they viewed them. But the SNP’s choices were starkly simple – they could boycott the Commission a la Calman or agree to participate. If they agreed to participate, they were agreeing to negotiate, and by definition, to surrender part of their best opening position, i.e.

The SNP continue to advocate Scottish independence, and believe that Scotland will one day become an independent country. But of course we accept the referendum result, which means that independence is not part of the Commission's considerations. We wish formally to associate ourselves with the 34-page set of proposals sent today by the Scottish Government, and which I enclose herewith

If such a seemingly inevitable set of compromises were made, the SNP/Green bloc was accepting that a deal had been struck and, subject only to the over-arching qualifier that they believed that “Scotland will one day become an independent country” they were honour-bound to stand behind any deal they made.

The clear alternative, implicit in any negotiation, was deadlock followed by breakdown and walking away from the table.

However the political choices made this seemingly simple strategy more complex. Let’s examine the possible scenarios resulting from this choice.

If the SNP had refused to participate in the Smith Commission, the Unionist block would simply have met, deliberated, and reached a consensus recommendation to Westminster. (It is just barely arguable that the three unionist parties might not have reached a consensus, and fragmented into a Labour versus Coalition deadlock. That would have been interesting …)

The SNP would then have been presented as bad losers, immature politicians, sulking on the sidelines of the new, post-referendum game.

In my view, they made the right choice – to participate, to play the game and accept La Règle du jeu (Jean Renoir 1939).

However,  the rules of the negotiating game also include the possibility of deadlock and breakdown, and a requirement that, faced with a bad deal and the failure of the process to satisfy crucial negotiating objectives, the SNP must walk out of the negotiation.

That scenario, albeit undesirable, was a viable one for the SNP. It was, after all, what most of the 1.6m YES voters expected from the Vow. It would not have surprised or shocked them. Nicola and the SNP Cabinet could have played a virtually identical hand to the one they did in fact play after the 27th November “deal” at FMQs and in the media – Powers inadequate, but they would be accepted and used, etc. There are obvious PR downsides to the scenario, but it has a certain integrity to it.

But the strategy – if there was one – seemed to be to work with the Commission, get the best deal on offer - in the full knowledge that it would fall far short of the Vow, of devomax, of federalism, of home rule - then criticise mercilessly the deal they had just made.

The major political upside of any deal that involved giving Scotland any new powers after a referendum defeat was that it would reopen the West Lothian Question in its new, nightmare reincarnation as EVEL – English Votes for English Laws – and leave the UK parties and constitutional arrangements in tatters in the run-up to the 2015 general election.

That has duly happened.

SUMMARY

I don’t propose to offer a critique of the new powers – that hatchet job has been done expertly and acrimoniously by just about everybody.

On balance, I think the SNP – and the Greens – were right to join the Smith Commission, and right not to breakdown and walk-away. If I have a criticism, it is that they misjudged the post-deal tone, which offended the sensibilities of an old negotiator like me, specifically that if you make a deal, you accept your part in it and blame no one but yourself for its inadequacies.

But then, I am not a politician, and doubt that I ever could have been one. I’m something much more important in our new Scotland – an informed and vigilant voter – and there’s another 1.6m of me at the very least.